Promoting a Post–Cold War Agenda

The Role of the U.S. Media in Shaping Competing Discourses over Democratic Development in Pretransfer Hong Kong

Paper presented at the Fourth Annual Kent State Symposium on Democracy

Bei Cai

Communications technology, modern transportation, and expanding economics are driving our world to globalize. As a result, the flow of commercial goods, business services, news, images, ideas, and cultural products has taken a transnational character. In the midst of all these important changes, the public is becoming ever more dependent on the media to report events and people in faraway places. Media, therefore, are wielding unprecedented power and influence in shaping how the public learns about world affairs.

Although reporters have been traditionally thought of as professionals who are trained and guided by the codes of journalistic practices, an increasing number of scholars are challenging the notion that media messages are objective accounts of what happens. Some scholars now approach journalism from a narrative and constructionalist perspective, seeing journalism as storytelling (Bennet and Edelman 1985; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Roeh 1989) and seeing reporters as social actors as well as political agents of their own societies (Mancini 1989; Patterson 1998). More recently, scholars who examine the political economy of the media argue that the media are influenced by efficiency and profits just like other businesses (Mansell 1993).

Turning to international communication, mass media scholars are becoming more concerned with the media’s roles, practices, and their journalistic objectives. First of all, the “big four” Western news agencies (AP, UPI, Reuter, and AFP) deliver about 85 percent of total foreign news, creating an unbalanced information flow between the few Western developed countries and the rest of the world (Mohammadi 1997). Additionally, some scholars argue that Western coverage of world events often exhibits a pro-Western orientation, since international affairs are often reported through primarily the British and the American cultural lenses (Dijk 1988; Lee and Solomon 1990; Riffe and Shaw 1982). Implications of media bias cannot be taken lightly in this age of globalization when the public grows increasingly dependent on the media to inform them about world affairs.

In the late 1980s the international political landscape was quickly changing. Between 1988 and 1989, communist regimes collapsed in Hungary, Poland, Germany, and Romania. In November 1989, the world witnessed the fall of the Berlin Wall. Eventually, communism collapsed in the former Soviet Union. The West views the defeat of the communist ideology as the ultimate triumph and testimony to the superiority of its values as well as its economic and political system. Therefore, a post–Cold War agenda is set to promote the liberal democratic capitalist system around the globe.

The transfer of Hong Kong from British to Chinese rule occurred at the beginning of the post–Cold War era. The British and the Chinese governments started in 1982 decade-long negotiations on the future of this former British colony. Since Hong Kong’s transfer was orchestrated by those with competing ideologies, and nation-state political and economic interests all intertwined, it was one of the most anticipated and reported international media events. Given America’s political and economic interest in Hong Kong and in China, the event attracted over one thousand American journalists from 108 news organizations (Lee et al. 2002). The business of representing the Hong Kong transfer posed a unique challenge. On the one hand, Great Britain is a key U.S. ally and partner in the effort to promote Western values and systems. On the other hand, the United States and China have different ideological orientations. The United States claims to be the leader of the Free World, while China is the largest remaining communist regime in the post–Cold War era. U.S. journalists found themselves covering many contentious issues not only between the British and the Chinese but also between the Americans and the Chinese and reporting these issues to the U.S. public.

Specifically, this study is interested in examining how two leading U.S. print media, the New York Times and the Washington Post, represented the competing discourses over democratic development in the pretransfer Hong Kong, and how the media representation of the issues influenced the American public’s opinions about it. In this study, I examined twenty-seven newspaper articles that were published three months before and two months after the transfer. Only articles that contributed to the topic of democratic development were examined. The two newspapers were chosen because of their prominence in the American print media and their influence on public opinions.

In the remaining section of this paper, I first explore the historical context that gave rise to the competing discourses surrounding the British proposal to introduce democratic development in the pretransfer Hong Kong. Then, I identify how the binary form of representation was constituted that gave meanings to the debate about Hong Kong’s democratic development. After that, I examine the problems that the binary form of representation was subjected to. Finally, I offer a critical examination of how U.S. journalists shaped competing discourses and how their reporting enhanced and limited the opinions of the American public about democratic development in Hong Kong. In the conclusion section, I discuss the media’s role in promoting America’s post–Cold War agenda. Questions are raised about media representation in the age of globalization.

Competing Discourses about Democratic Development in Pretransfer Hong Kong

The blueprint for the 1997 Hong Kong transfer was established in September 1984, when the Sino-British Joint Declaration was signed in a generally cooperative spirit to ensure a smooth power transition from the British to Chinese. The paramount benchmark was that Hong Kong’s existing social, economic, and legal systems would remain unchanged for at least fifty years after China claimed sovereignty over Hong Kong. In the view of leading British politicians and diplomats, the Joint Declaration was the best possible deal that they could negotiate with the Chinese on the future of Hong Kong under the Chinese rule (Cradock 1994).

However, during the thirteen years following the treaty, the initial cooperative spirit gave way to a changing political climate, particularly in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident in 1989. Although the British had rejected calls for democratization by Hong Kong residents in 1894, 1916, 1929, and 1949 (Kuen 1997), they were under increasing pressure and criticism from democracy advocates inside Hong Kong and from the U.S. media. Beginning in the 1990s the British began a more confrontational posture with the Chinese government. One of the most debated issues centered on the British proposal to introduce democratic development in the pretransfer Hong Kong.

Consequently, as the 1997 transition was approaching, two competing visions for Hong Kong’s political future emerged: the executive-led system and the legislature-led system. The divide over the two visions reflected Hong Kong’s colonial legacy. Historically, the executive-led system had always been the status quo. It originated in what was known as the Crown Colony government system, whereby the British ruled Hong Kong through the vast powers of the governor appointed by the queen as the local representative of the Crown (Ghai 1999; Kuen 1997). Among the powers granted to the governor were powers to make laws and appoint or dismiss judges (Kuen 1997). Most important, not only did the governor preside over the executive council, whose members he selected and appointed, but also he appointed all members of the legislative council. Under the executive-led system, except for the requirement that the governor had to defer major policy decisions to London, the governor and his administration had little responsibility to the legislature or to Hong Kong residents (Ghai 1999).

In addition, since promoting Britain’s commercial interests had always been the top objective of the colonial administration throughout the colony’s history, the British Hong Kong administration ran the colony in close relationship with the business community. This tight relationship was driven by the logic of laissez-faire capitalism—a powerful executive, minimum government interference in businesses, low taxation, weak labor unions, and an efficient bureaucracy, all working to benefit the economy (Roberti 1996).

Beginning in 1992 the British had a change of mind as they started to push for a legislature-led system to replace the status quo. Under the legislature-led system, the traditionally prominent executive power would be subjected to and held accountable to the elected legislature, whose powers were to be mandated by the public (Flowerdew 1998; Ghai 1999; Kuen 1997). As the British envisioned, representative government would thus be introduced and implemented into Hong Kong’s future political system, pushing Hong Kong in the direction of democratization.

By pledging its commitment in the Joint Declaration that Hong Kong’s existing social, economic, and legal systems would remain unchanged for fifty years, the Chinese government gave its support for the executive-led system. From the Chinese point of view, the executive-led system should be unchanged since it had been tremendously successful in maintaining Hong Kong’s economic progress over the years. In addition, the executive-led system most suited Hong Kong, given that a laissez-faire economy needed a government that could make effective and timely decisions in a competitive international market (Kuen 1997). Finally, as China needed Hong Kong to channel financial resources and business expertise to its own economic development, China wanted to continue the probusiness stance of the British Hong Kong administration (Ghai 1999; Flowerdew 1998; Kuen 1997). Clearly, it would not be in China’s interests if Hong Kong’s economy in the post-transfer era were weakened.

With millions of dollars invested in Hong Kong, the business community also instinctively wanted to maintain the status quo. Like the Chinese, the business community defended the executive-led system as being more efficient than the system of checks and balances in a representative government (Roberti 1996). Others feared that democracy would harm the economy and investors’ interest by decreasing the political importance and privileges of business (Ghai 1999; Roberti 1996). Still other business people warned that democratization might lead to increased social expenditures and higher taxes on the one hand, and social instability on the other (Flowerdew 1998; Ghai 1999). Many from the business community took the position that democracy was important, but it was not the only goal. Rather, a smooth transition was more vital during what might otherwise be a nervous and unstable period for Hong Kong (Flowerdew 1998).

However, the British insisted that the push for the legislature-led system was based on principles, necessity, and good judgment. From their point of view, the move toward the legislature-led system would allow Hong Kong citizens to participate in the political process, and it would make the future Hong Kong administration more responsive to the needs of the public (Ghai 1999). More importantly, supporters for the legislature-led system argued that the absence of democracy would leave Hong Kong open to manipulation by China, especially when the extensive powers of the executive were to be appointed and approved by the Chinese government. Therefore, democratic reform was not only essential for maintaining the post-transfer Hong Kong as an open, freewheeling capitalist society but also indispensable in preventing the authoritarian China from crushing Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom (Ghai 1999).

Hong Kong needed to recognize two very different goals: the introduction of democratic development and the maintenance of economic stability in a time of transition. Hong Kong could not afford to seek one at the expense of the other. How, then, did U.S. journalists represent the two goals? And how did they shape the competing discourses surrounding Hong Kong’s democratic development?

After close reading and examination of the twenty-seven newspaper articles collected from the Washington Post and the New York Times, a persistent system of representation emerged that resembles what Stuart Hall (1997) identifies as a “binary form of representation” (229). That is, the contested issues surrounding the introduction of democratic development in the pretransfer Hong Kong were consistently framed by many American reporters via a binary opposition of “prodemocracy” and “probusiness.” The use of the binary opposition by reporters portrayed the debate about Hong Kong’s democratic development as a moral choice between democracy and profit; and it portrayed democracy advocates as oppression fighters against the Communists. Such a representation fixated on seeing the debate in moralistic terms.

Representing Business Groups as Prioritizing Trade over Democracy

Many American reporters represented probusiness groups as “prioritizing” trade over democracy, and as choosing business over democracy. According to reporters, Hong Kong’s incoming chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa, and Hong Kong’s business elite all emphasized “the primacy of economic growth and stability over political rights and freedoms” (Gargan, June 13, 1997); they “favored order and stability over accelerated democracy” (Richburg, July 1, 1997); and they “favor[ed]” commercial efficiency [and] muted democracy” (Richburg, June 30, 1997). Similarly, some U.S. reporters criticized the pro-business groups in that they put “trade over everything” (Rosenthal, May 27, 1997); that they “care[d] only about money” (Gargan, June 30, 1997); that they had “little respect for democracy” (McGuire, July 1, 1997); and that they were “preoccupied with profits” (“Red star over Hong Kong,” June 29, 1997). Other reporters saw Hong Kong’s business elite as “unabashedly pro-China, profess[ing] faith in market forces” (Richburg, June 30, 1997); and that they downplayed the significance of Hong Kong’s democratic reform by noting that “Hong Kong [was] essentially about one thing, and that was business” (Franklin, June 29, 1997). Finally, some U.S. reporters criticized multinational American business corporations for choosing profit over democracy. According to some reporters, American businesses would “ignore gross human rights violations” (Balz, May 28, 1997); that they were “more interested in cutting their own deals with China than guarding Hong Kong’s unique character” (McGuire, July 1, 1997); that they took a conciliatory gesture toward China in fear of losing business contracts (Sugawara, May 14, 1997); and that they were willing to “overlook China’s treachery and tyranny” for profit (Shields, May 14, 1997).

Representing Democracy as a Moral Issue

The debate about Hong Kong’s democratic development was represented as a choice of moral values. According to many human-rights activists, to be both effective and true to the American values, the United States needed to have an active policy of promoting more freedom and democracy in Hong Kong and in China (Friedman, May 26, 1997). House minority leader, Richard A. Gephardt argued that human rights must be at the very core of America’s foreign economic policies to advance America’s national interests, ideals, and basic values (Yang, May 28, 1997). The last British Hong Kong governor, Christopher Patten, who was responsible for introducing last-minute democracy in Hong Kong, also appealed to democracy as “the ultimate value” and as the “universal value” that constitutes the best form of government ever devised (Patten, 1998, 155). The appeal of moral values would be rhetorically effective to an American audience that was socialized into a political culture that prescribed unquestionable positive meanings for democratic values.

Representing the Prodemocracy Group as Oppression Fighters

Reporters “found” in the prodemocracy camp a coalition of prodemocracy advocates from inside Hong Kong and other American groups, including human-rights activists, labor-union activists, and social and religious groups. American reporters represented Hong Kong’s prodemocracy advocates as “democracy fighters,” whose “anti-Communist crusade” would take on Communist China for attempting to control Hong Kong’s democracy and freedom (Richburg, June 29, 1997; June 30, 1997). Religious groups from the United States went on the warpath against China’s “brutal repression of Christians” (Shields, May 14, 1997) and for China’s birth-control policy that resulted in millions of forced abortions each year (Friedman, May 26, 1997). U.S. labor activists fought against China, “the Big Wage Menace,” as millions of Chinese were working for fifty cents an hour to take millions of jobs away from U.S. workers (Friedman, May 26, 1997; Rosenthal, July 4, 1997; Shields, May 14, 1997). Fearing that Communist Chinese would undo Hong Kong’s democracy and freedom, the coalition of democracy advocates, labor-union activists, religious and human-rights activists pressed the U.S. Congress to play the role of “an arbiter and protector” (Erlanger, July 2, 1997), “the main watchdog” (Richburg, June 2, 1997), and “the guardian” for Hong Kong when the Chinese Communists took over the territory (Erlanger, April 19, 1997).

Given its dichotomized nature, the binary opposition of prodemocracy and probusiness invited the audience to see the debate about Hong Kong’s democratic development in oppositional terms. The dichotomized rhetoric locked the audience into a predetermined understanding of the tension between prodemocracy groups and probusiness groups, distorting and truncating the complex debate about Hong Kong’s democratic development. As a result, it is critical that we pause here to examine the business of representation in general and the binary form of representation in particular as a patterned system of representation that gives and produces meanings.

Representation and Cultural-Other Representation

Stuart Hall has written extensively on the topic of representation. According to him (1997), “representation is an essential part of the process by which meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture” (15). However, representation does not happen at random. In fact, there are “systems of representation” that consist of “different ways of organizing, clustering, arranging and classifying concepts, and of establishing complex relations between them” (Hall, 1997, 17). Representation, as Burke (1966) reminds us, is always a reduction that narrows the scope of meanings so that an event comes into a meaningful, clear, and coherent focus. To do so, systems of representation often select objects either for attention or inattention, emphasis or de-emphasis, and salience or absence, depending on how certain aspects of an event are strategically made present and others are made absent.

The business of representation takes on new significance when faraway cultures and events are represented to the American public, who could only learn about them secondhand. Representation of cultural others, as Lidchi (1997) argues, underscores “an active process of representation” that involves constructing one culture for another (200). Sharing the same view is Clifford Geertz (1988), who cautions that since cultural-other representation involves a process in which one culture uses its own systems of representation (for example, values, beliefs, discursive practices, and traditions) to give meanings to events of another culture, the writings of another culture become morally and politically delicate. Cultural-other representation therefore bears political implications, calling into question the media coverage of international events.

Binary Form of Representation

The world presents itself to humans as a multitude of phenomena and ever-changing events. These events are entangled, obscure, and complex. In an effort to make sense of the multifarious phenomena of the world, humans create some all-embracing ideas, categories, and concepts that give them a grasp of the world. According to Fontaine (1986–97) and Hall (1997), humans have two primary ways of sorting and grouping. Either they put those things together that resemble each other by means of analogies or they oppose objects and things that are different by means of binaries.

Admittedly, dualistic systems are indispensable for humans to capture the multitude of phenomena and events of the world in some coherent ways. Yet, as a system of representation, binary oppositions control, limit, and order how humans perceive and make sense of their world, causing three serious problems. First, dualistic thinking has generated few neutral binary oppositions. Rather, there is usually a relation of power ascribed to the poles of a binary opposition, whereby “one of the two terms governs the other, or has the upper hand” (Derrida, 1972, 41). As such, instead of a “peaceful coexistence” of the poles, there is a “violent hierarchy” where one pole dominates the other (Derrida, 1972, 41). Hebdige (1996) also recognizes the hierarchy by noting that dualistic structures tend to generate “the illusion of priority which tends to collect around one term in any binary opposition” (184). Recognizing the power dimensions embedded in binary oppositions, Stuart Hall (1997) suggests that binary oppositions should be written as “white/black, men/women, masculine/feminine, upper class/lower class, [and] British/alien” (235; emphasis original).

Second, the binary form of representation has a logic that is deeply problematic in that it gives rise to a reductionist understanding of complex issues. As William James (1986) argues, if Person A says to Person B, either accept this truth or go without it, Person A puts on Person B a forced option, as if every dilemma were based on a complete logical disjunction. Therefore, it is critical to realize that binary oppositions are “a rather crude and reductionalist way of establishing meaning” (Hall, 1997, 235), making it a problematic system of representation for issues and events that are imbued with contradictions and paradoxes (Graber, McQuail, and Norris 1998).

Third, the binary form of representation has saturated in our political discourse, giving rise to political dualism—the tendency of a group to assume that its values, social structures, practices, and beliefs are the only correct ones. According to Craige (1996), political dualism is “a model of competition, in which relationships among unlike groups are expected to be antagonistic” (3). Furthermore, political dualism can be a form of “domination” that denies “diversity” because it makes one’s own values legitimate and makes those of others illegitimate (Craige, 1996, 3). For people to have an appreciation of human society as an evolving interdependent global system, Craige argues that allegiance to men or to a group is the fertile ground for nationalism and racism. Rather, allegiance to international laws will foster a more coherent, cooperative, and mutually respectful world community in which true democracy and equality among the members of the world community is possible. Wander (1984) in fact theorizes dualism as a rhetorical frame in his analysis of America’s foreign policy discourse that often divides the world into two camps, “one side is accord with all that is good, decent, and at one with God’s will, and the other side is in direct opposition” (342). The consequence of political dualism, as Wander suggests, is that humans create a hierarchical order—there are superior and inferior nations.

As the analysis in this study indicated, reporters tended to turn the debate surrounding Hong Kong’s democratic development into a forced option: you were either for democracy or for business. The forced option presented by reporters betrayed that Hong Kong needed democratic change as much as it needed continued stability. However, with all its cultural and political capital, the prodemocracy position was represented by many American reporters in a way that contained a judgment toward it—the prodemocracy agenda had a higher moral standing than that of the profit-driven business agenda. After all, who can oppose “democracy”? Even worse, who can oppose introducing democracy to an open, freewheeling capitalist society that was to be taken over by the last remaining Communist regime that would by ideology control freedom and democracy?

The binary opposition was consolidated by representing probusiness groups as prioritizing trade over democracy; by representing democracy as a moral issue; and by representing prodemocracy groups as oppression fighters. When the tension between prodemocracy groups and probusiness groups was consigned into such a dichotomized rhetoric, American reporters limited the audience’s understanding of the following misrepresentations—misrepresentations that clearly worked to the advantages of America’s post–Cold War agenda—promoting Western democracy globally.

Misrepresenting “Unchange” in the Joint Declaration and in the Basic Law

Many reporters from the two leading American newspapers misrepresented the legal and technical difficulties regarding Hong Kong’s democratic development. That is, when the British and the Chinese signed the Joint Declaration in December 1984, the ultimate goal was to ensure that Hong Kong’s existing social, political, and economic systems would remain unchanged for fifty years, despite the change of sovereignty. As such, the Joint Declaration constituted an overarching policy of “unchange” (Ching 1997; Ghai 1999; Flowerdew 1998; Knight and Nakano 1999). Because of that, there was little foundation in the Joint Declaration for the course of democracy. In fact, the word democracy did not even appear in the Joint Declaration (Ghai 1999). The British started to push for democracy after the signing of the Joint Declaration, particularly in the aftermath of Tiananmen incident in 1989 (Flowerdew 1998). Since many reporters were so occupied at supporting democratic development in Hong Kong, they selectively forgot the “unchanged” benchmark, leaving the debate about Hong Kong’s democratic development to be ideologically politicized.

Equally important, many reporters misrepresented that the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law had a specific form of democracy in mind. After examining the Joint Declaration closely, several scholars concluded that a fully elected government was out of the question, because what the Joint Declaration envisioned was an executive-led government—a narrow elite, although a democratic spirit was bestowed on this narrow elite by their being elected (Flowerdew 1998; Ghai 1999; Ying 1998). Such a system is very close to what some scholars consider the dominant model of democracy after World War II—”“democratic elitism” (Kuen 1997; Hackett and Zhao 1998). However, after the Joint Declaration was signed, the British and prodemocracy groups started to push for a different model of democracy, the legislature-led government. The push for a legislature-led system would shift power from businesses to individual citizens, changing Hong Kong profoundly. Given the traditional dominance and influence of Hong Kong’s business elite in the world’s most laissez-faire capitalist economy, resistance to the new model of democracy was strong.

Misrepresenting Ambiguity in the Joint Declaration and in the Basic Law

Many reporters misrepresented that the debate about Hong Kong’s transition to democratic election resulted from a lack of a precise timetable in both the Joint Declaration and in the Basic Law. That is, the Joint Declaration did not specify a timetable except for the vague statement that “the legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by election.” Likewise, the Basic Law gave the same vague statement that the general principle for democratic election should be that of a “gradual and orderly progress in light of the actual situation” in the post-transfer Hong Kong. Instead of acknowledging the vague guidelines set in the Joint Declaration and in the Basic Law, reporters dichotomized the tension between probusiness groups and prodemocracy groups by turning it into forced choices—democracy or business and democracy over business.

By doing so, reporters denied that there was a general consensus on theory between the British and the Chinese that the number of elected legislative council members would gradually increase, as it was evidenced in both the Joint Declaration and in the Basic Law. What could not be agreed on by the British and the Chinese was more of a technical difficulty—how many members of the legislative council should be elected, and how fast the transition should be made so that an increasing number of them were directly elected by Hong Kong residents. According to probusiness groups, if democratic development were introduced too fast, Hong Kong’s stability and continued prosperity would be threatened. In contrast, prodemocracy groups insisted that the Chinese Communists would crush Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom if democratic development were introduced too slowly. Yet, as reporters signed up with the prodemocracy agenda, they failed to acknowledge that Hong Kong had another equally important goal to accomplish in a time of transition—its need for continued economic stability and prosperity.

Misrepresenting Democratic Development in Post-Transfer Hong Kong

Reporters misrepresented that the post-transfer Hong Kong was in fact more democratic than the pretransfer Hong Kong. Admittedly, Hong Kong under the British rule had a laissez-faire economy, an unfettered press, free speech, an independent judicial system, and the rule of law. As such, Hong Kong was a free, open, and liberal society in the economic and social domains. However, as Saward (1998) argues, the minimal features a political system must display before it can be considered a democracy is whether it has regular, free, fair, and open elections for at least the legislative body and, where appropriate, for the head of state. Hong Kong as a colony, by that standard, was not a democratic society because its legislative council was only partially elected two years before the transfer, and its governors, before 1997, were always appointed by Her Majesty (Ching 1997, Knight and Nakano 1999; Kuen 1997). Several scholars remind us that there is a distinction between a liberal society and a democratic society, and they share the view that Hong Kong had been a colony without much democracy (Ching 1997; Finer 1999; Flowerdew 1998; Kuen 1997). Yet, many reporters were blind to that critical distinction, describing the colonial Hong Kong as a free, democratic society when in actuality representative democracy did not exist there until two years before the 1997 transition.

Despite China’s repeated assurances that Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom would be protected when Hong Kong came under Chinese rule, many American reporters were not convinced. For example, when the Chinese Foreign Minister, Qian Qichen, talked with President Clinton, he assured him that under China’s rule “democracy, freedoms and human rights enjoyed by the Hong Kong people would be more extensive” than under the British colonial rule (Yang and Harris, May 1, 1997). He again promised that Hong Kong would be governed solely by local officials approved by Beijing (Erlanger, April 15, 1997). In spite of China’s repeated assurances, there was an aura of negativism in the U.S. media coverage of Hong Kong’s democratic development, and reporters did not give China the benefit of a doubt (Ching 1997; Knight and Nakano 1999). Criticism and suspicion of China by reporters stood in sharp contrast to the readiness reporters demonstrated in crediting the British for introducing democratic development in Hong Kong.

Although the British rejected calls for democratization from Hong Kong residents on four different occasions, many reporters gave high remarks regarding Britain’s last-minute introduction of democracy. For example, some reporters praised the last governor, Christopher Patten, for his “determined effort to bring democratic politics and accountability to Hong Kong’s colonial government” (Gargan, June 29, 1997); for his vision to “baptize Hong Kong in the sea of democratic politics” (Gargan, June 26, 1997); and for his objective to “move Hong Kong toward a genuine measure of democratic governance and accountability” (Gargan, June 29, 1997).

Unlike many American reporters, some critics argued that the token democracy bestowed on Hong Kong by the British at the eve of departure may well have been Britain’s attempt to withdraw from Hong Kong with “honor” (Flowerdew, 1998, 217; Paau, 1998, 7), and with “dignity” (Scott, 1989, 21; Segal, 1993, 99). Some critics even questioned why the British “hurried through the enactment or revision of more than fifty laws in the last hundred days of their rule in HK” (Paau, 1998, 76). As many American reporters were giving credit to the British for introducing democratic development, they were silent about an inconsistency on the part of the British, who had been consistently reluctant to introduce representative government to Hong Kong, despite calls for democratization on four occasions. The difficulty for pushing democratic development in Hong Kong was complicated, among other factors, by Britain’s inconsistency over the issue, causing the Chinese and many in the business community to be suspicious of their motives for doing so at the eleventh hour of their rule. At the same time, the British support for democratic development was further undermined by the overwhelming concern about “communist China,” as if there was no need for democracy when they ruled Hong Kong, but democracy became indispensable when China would rule.

Capitalism and Democracy in Contention: An Incoherent Post–Cold War Agenda

Prodemocracy groups and probusiness groups had their ultimate split over how democracy should be promoted in Hong Kong and in China. Probusiness groups not only viewed China as the largest potential market, but also expressed strong confidence in economic liberalism. According to them, a free market would generate “all the necessary elements of an open and free society” (Hiatt, June 30, 1997) that would “build pressures over time toward political liberation” (Balz, May 28, 1997). Because of their confidence in economic liberalism, probusiness groups supported the Clinton administration’s policy to use a free-market economy as leverage to promote democracy rather than using human rights as a prerequisite for pressuring China to adopt democratic change (Erlanger, April 15, 1997; Mufson, May 1, 1997; Yang, May 28, 1997).

In contrast, prodemocracy groups viewed China as an authoritarian communist regime that would control political freedom and civil and religious rights in Hong Kong. They looked intently at what they considered China’s poor human-rights record, its repressive religious policies, and its harsh dealings with political dissidents. Unlike probusiness groups, prodemocracy groups argued that the relationship between a free-market economy and democracy was that of an “intimate connection” (Hiatt, June 30, 1997), of an “essential connection” (Yang, May 28, 1997), and of a “necessary connection” (Matlock, September 13, 1997). Given their belief that political freedom went hand in hand with capitalism, prodemocracy groups insisted that trade be linked with democracy (Hiatt, June 30, 1997; Pollack, July 3, 1997; Richburg, June 29, 1997).

To understand the positions that each took in the debate about Hong Kong’s democratic development, it is critical that we pause to examine the two most fundamental American values—capitalism and democracy and the relationship between them.

Many scholars have thoroughly studied capitalism and democracy and their relationship with each other, given that the two traditions of values dominate American life and shape public discussions about politics, economy, social issues, policy making on the national level, and foreign policy on the international level. First, scholars inform us that capitalism and democracy share the same historical origin. By the turn of the twentieth century, modern capitalism and modern democracy together protested against traditional societies that allowed special privileges based on birth, caste, entitlement, or social status. In addition, capitalism and democracy share many similar values. As McClosky and Zaller (1984) summarize, the two together constitute a liberal tradition that embraces such values as liberty, freedom, equality, individualism, competition, private property, free trade, limited government, progress, and rational decision-making.

Despite their common historical origin and many shared values, scholars recognize that a free-market economy and democracy have different philosophical orientations. Capitalism is primarily concerned with maximizing private profit while democracy aims at maximizing freedom, equality, and the public good (Bell 1960; McClosky and Zaller 1984; Novak 1982; Wood 1995). In fact, their different philosophical orientations are the very reasons why social space in a liberal democratic capitalism is divided into two discrete realms: “the public realm” and “the private realm”; “the economic realm” and “the political realm” (Bowles and Gintis, 1986, 17). The public realm is considered to be the state that should, according to liberal values, be limited. In contrast, the private realm houses the unfettered individualist capitalist economy that should be protected and unfettered by the state (Bowles and Gintis 1986). The division of a liberal democratic capitalist society into two discrete realms begs the question—what is the relationship between capitalism and democracy?

The relationship between capitalism and democracy has been the object of argument in political philosophy for several decades. There are those who firmly believe that capitalism and democracy are harmonious, complementary, compatible, and mutually supportive (Bernstein, Berger, and Godsell 1998; Bowles and Gintis 1986; Coe and Wilber 1985; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992). In fact, some often see democracy and capitalism as being “virtually identical” (Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, 1992, 1). In contrast, other scholars contend that capitalism and democracy are contradictory, where socioeconomic inequality coexists with civil freedom and equality, and political equality coexists with class inequality (Bowles and Gintis 1986; Wood 1995; Coe and Wilber 1985). In fact, Novak (1982) contends that the privileged position enjoyed by business in the capitalist economic system is “the main adversary and barrier to a more fully developed democracy” (180). Many other scholars are less confident about any causal or inherent relationship between the two. Rather, they suggest that impressive capitalist achievements are possible under non-democratic regimes such as in imperial Germany, Meiji Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan after World War II.

The tension between prodemocracy groups and probusiness groups over Hong Kong’s democratic development clearly suggests that the relationship between a free-market economy and democracy is complex. Making it more complex, democratic values enjoy a higher moral status than a capitalist economy in the American political tradition (Heilman 1968). As McClosky and Zaller (1984) argue, democratic ideals are the primary inspiration for the founding of the American republic, and they are embodied in the nation’s most cherished documents such as the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. Although political leaders often advocate limits on private enterprises in order to preserve democratic values, few are willing to argue in public the reverse case (McClosky and Zaller 1984). For the same reason, conservatives, Republicans, and other champions of capitalism are reluctant to attack the democratic tradition in the same way that liberal democrats criticize a laissez-faire economy (Ellis 1993). Therefore, when democratic values and capitalist values are in contention, reporters often align themselves more to the former than to the latter—they usually sympathize with labor more than they do with business on economic issues; they generally favor government regulation of business; they favor government’s policy to reduce income inequality (Lichter, Lichter, and Rothman 1990).

When the tension between capitalism and democracy was framed via the binary of prodemocracy and probusiness, reporters turned the debate from a legal and technical question concerning which model of democracy should be followed and how fast should it be introduced to a question of the moral imperative of democracy itself. The value hierarchy occupied by democratic values and capitalist values in the American political discourse impelled reporters to dictate a preferred reading of the tension between democracy and business—accepting prodemocracy agenda and rejecting profit-driven business agenda. The oppositional nature of binary oppositions eventually reduced the dynamic and complex process of democratization into an either/or option, negating the possibility for coexistence between democratic values and capitalist values.

Conclusion

The 1997 Hong Kong transfer from British to Chinese sovereignty happened at a time when the West had supposedly won the Cold War. Seeing the Hong Kong transfer as a continued chapter of the Cold War, reporters covered Hong Kong but they aimed at communist China (Ching 1997; Knight and Nakano 1999). For example, American reporters represented the pretransfer Hong Kong as part of the Free World, and the “post-transfer” Hong Kong as part of the Chinese communist regime. By doing so, they evoked the image that Hong Kong would experience a sudden change. The projected change created by reporters invited the readers to believe that the communist Chinese were taking over Hong Kong, an impression revealing American reporters’ obsession with the idea that Hong Kong was to return to “communist China.” Clearly, fear and distrust of communism in general and the Chinese communist government specifically hardened the debate about Hong Kong’s democratic development, politicizing it into an ideological struggle between the Free World and the communism.

Several scholars took notice that the debate about Hong Kong’s political system was overshadowed by an overriding consideration—the need to install a fully democratic system to counter communism (Kuen 1997; Knight and Nakano 1999; Lee et al. 2002). Reflecting on foreign media coverage of the Hong Kong transfer, Knight and Nakano (1999) concluded that the distrust of the Communist Chinese prompted American reporters to prejudge the outcome of Hong Kong’s democratic development in a decisively negative fashion. The concern with what the Communists would do or undo to Hong Kong’s democracy and freedom was so preoccupying that many reporters found little validity in the argument that fast democratic development could threaten Hong Kong’s economic stability, in the face of ample evidence that worried Hong Kong businesses were diverting their capital to other countries (Flowerdew 1998). Likewise, reporters’ distrust of communist China was not mollified although democratic development was a provision in the Basic Law that was approved by the Chinese government. Finally, American reporters were not convinced and persuaded by the argument that China’s self-interest in Hong Kong’s future would motivate China to take a hands-off approach. Rather, many reporters came to Hong Kong with their own “preconceived ideas” (21), and they kept building their work according to “a predetermined agenda” (106). Soon, many of them began to observe and see what they came to observe and see.

Opinion polls in Hong Kong gathered during the pre- and post-transfer period indicated a huge opinion gap between American reporters and Hong Kong residents. When asked what they thought were the most “serious problems” facing Hong Kong, respondents ranked social and economic issues to be of greater concern with them, followed by political issues (Paau 1998). Nevertheless, as Atwood and Major (1996) state, “public” opinion from Hong Kong residents did not grace the printed page. Instead, “published” opinions from the American media were asserting the post–Cold War agenda. The push for democratic development to counter the communists became so pressing that all the other concerns became less relevant, less real, less important, and less urgent (244).

As a form of constructed knowledge, the business of representing cultural others in the U.S. media calls into question the primacy of authorship—reporters as opinion leaders and as agents of their own cultures and values. As some scholars argue, American reporters, when it comes to foreign news, tend to reflect the policies, interests, and cultural values of the American society, appropriating a representation of cultural others in an American discourse inspired by American cultural values (Chomsky 1989; Said 1981; Gans 1979; Gitlin 1980). In reporting Hong Kong’s democratic development, the prodemocracy–probusiness binary opposition portrayed an extremely distorted picture of the dynamics and the complexity of the issues. Such a depiction undeniably reflected America’s post–Cold War agenda in promoting democracy in Hong Kong and in Communist China.

In the post–Cold War era, many American reporters are quick to assume the superiority of the liberal democratic capitalist system. However, their efforts to promote Western systems blind them from seeing an incoherence demonstrated by Western nations throughout world history. The British, when ruling Hong Kong as a colonial power for nearly 156 years, never allowed Hong Kong to have self-government—the fundamental feature of democracy. While crediting the British for introducing democratic development into Hong Kong, many American reporters were silent about failures of democracy at the hands of Western powers.

Debates about the relationship between capitalism and democracy are ongoing, as we have witnessed in the clash between global free trade and concerns for human rights and global environmental protection in Seattle, Canada, and Italy. The same tension was seen in the debate about Hong Kong’s democratic development. However, the assumption of the superiority of the liberal democratic capitalist system disables some reporters from recognizing that democratic values and capitalist values can sometimes be in contention, creating an uncomfortable and uncertain system. Most critically, the inherited discourse from the Cold War paradigm does not prepare many American reporters to account for a seemingly contradictory emerging reality: China is adopting a market economy, while it still retains its one-party communist rule. If the world used to be a simpler and predictable place when it was aligned along an East-West duality (“Global News after the Cold War” 1993), the post–Cold War era has not provided reporters with a clear and coherent framework. How to represent international events in the post–Cold War era is the challenge that the media have to face, particularly at a time when they are required to play an important role in our globalizing community.

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